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INTEREST ANALYSIS IN INTERJURISDICTIONAL
MARRIAGE DISPUTES
TOBIAS BARRINGTON WOLFF†
INTRODUCTION
Gay and lesbian couples are now entering into legally authorized
marriages for the first time in our nation’s history.  As has happened
many times before when significant policy differences have emerged
among the civil marriage laws of different jurisdictions, these newly
married couples will inevitably move about the country, and state
courts will have to decide whether, when, and for what purpose to give
effect to their marriages when forum law would have prohibited the
couples from marrying locally.  The debate over this recognition prob-
lem is already fully joined.  Thus far, however, that debate has most
frequently been characterized by positions that are sweeping and un-
conditional.  On one side, skeptics argue that the federal Defense of
Marriage Act1 and the public policy exception in choice-of-law analysis
together grant states the power to disregard any marriage that contra-
venes local law.  On the other side, advocates of recognition invoke an
array of constitutional arguments—based upon equality principles,
vested right theories, and claims about the privileges of citizenship—
to contend that states may never exercise such a discriminatory and
disruptive power against the marriages of gay couples.  These are the
lightning and thunder of legal analysis:  categorical claims of state
authority met with categorical claims of constitutional invalidity.
It is not surprising that a contentious issue would provoke a con-
tentious debate, and this focus on broad questions of state power and
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constitutional principle is both necessary and appropriate—the more
so in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas,2
which has fundamentally altered the reception that gay couples can
expect when they assert constitutional claims.  Many of the disputes
that state courts will confront when married gay couples move and
travel around the country, however, will not be resolved by the heat
and noise of this debate.  Until the Supreme Court of the United
States is prepared to place its institutional capital behind a principle
of fully equal treatment for gay and lesbian couples—as I believe it
will, in time—those couples must be prepared to engage courts in a
discussion about what is sensible and advisable, not merely what is
mandatory or prohibited.
Among the most important elements in that discussion, and my
focus in this Article, will be an examination of the range of interests
that a state may assert in considering whether to give effect to a gay
couple’s marriage.  That examination does require some attention to
recent constitutional developments.  While the Court has assiduously
avoided any statement about the constitutional right of gay couples to
marry in its recent decisions, it has nonetheless established principles
that inform the range of interests that a state may legitimately assert as
a basis for denying recognition to the validly celebrated marriages of
those couples.
In the body of cases produced by past disputes over racially mixed
marriages, consanguineous or incestuous relationships, marriages in-
volving minors, and other contentious relationship categories, state
courts have relied upon two primary rationales for refusing to give ef-
fect to marriages that have been validly celebrated in other jurisdic-
tions:  a desire to exclude certain sexual couplings or romantic rela-
tionships entirely from their borders; and a desire to express the
moral disapproval with which the state regards the disputed relation-
ship.  Some courts have also hinted at a third rationale that functions
as a corollary of sorts to the first two:  a desire to dissuade couples in
the disfavored relationship from migrating to the state in the first
place.  The legitimacy of each of these state interests, as applied to gay
couples, is now in serious doubt.  In Lawrence, the Court held that a
state may not exclude gay sexuality or gay relationships from its bor-
ders.3  In Romer v. Evans,4 and also in Lawrence, the Court rejected
2
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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Id. at 578-79 (holding that the Constitution’s protection of personal liberty en-
compasses the right of consenting adults to engage in private sexual conduct without
governmental interference).
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moral disapproval, without more, as a basis for subjecting gay citizens
to selectively disfavored treatment.5  And in Saenz v. Roe,6 the Court
found that a state has no legitimate interest in seeking to dissuade a
class of citizens from migrating to its territory by structuring its legal
entitlements to make migration more difficult.7  Together, these deci-
sions have significantly altered the landscape for interest analysis in
recognition cases.
It is not my purpose in this Article to argue that these decisions
impose a constitutional duty upon states to give effect to the relation-
ships of married gay couples.  The interests described above are not
the only ones that a state might attempt to rely upon in a recognition
dispute.  More broadly, as with Loving v. Virginia8 (itself an interjuris-
dictional marriage dispute), it seems likely that a definitive constitu-
tional ruling on recognition will have to wait until the federal courts
are ready to rule on the underlying right of gay couples to marry in
the first place.  Whether that decision constitutes a flash of lightning
or a low rumble of fading thunder when it arrives, it can and should
be preceded by a body of subconstitutional rulings by state-court
judges engaged in a good-faith attempt to determine what interests
are legitimately in play in a recognition case and how those interests
should be analyzed.  It is my hope that this Article will serve to facili-
tate and sharpen that inquiry.
In Part I, I canvas a broad array of interjurisdictional marriage
disputes and examine in detail the interests that state courts have of-
fered in discussing whether and for what purpose to give effect to a
marriage that runs contrary to local law.  I train particular focus on
the three interests described above and examine the constitutional
status of an attempt to apply each of these rationales to a married gay
couple in the wake of Lawrence, Romer, and Saenz.  In Part II, I discuss
the statutes and constitutional provisions that a majority of states have
now enacted to ban marriage by same-sex couples.  Many of these
“mini Defense of Marriage Acts,” as they are often called, have used
broad language to declare that marriages between gay couples are
“void.”  Even so, the impact that these provisions should have upon
the marriages of gay couples who validly marry elsewhere and then
4
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travel or move to another state is a matter of legitimate dispute.  In
previous marriage controversies, courts have often required that the
legislature make a clear and unmistakable statement of its intent to
deny recognition to good-faith marriages performed out of state, even
in the face of broad language declaring such marriages “absolutely
void” when performed locally.  Part II discusses the desirability of such
a clear-statement rule, particularly in light of the newly constrained
vocabulary of interests available to the states in seeking to deny recog-
nition.  Finally, in Part III, I place these recognition issues in a larger
context by discussing the particular mode of subordination that char-
acterizes most discrimination against gay people:  the fantasy, percep-
tible even when it is left unspoken, that gay people and gay relation-
ships will simply cease to exist if they are denied any type of social
visibility or formal acknowledgment.  The proper way to frame the
analysis in a recognition dispute, I argue here, is to inquire into the
most sensible way to treat the married gay and lesbian couples who
will inevitably live within a jurisdiction, and not to perpetuate an un-
real discussion about whether it is desirable for those couples to exist
in the first place.  If we expose and confront the fantasy that often ob-
fuscates this common-sense observation, the analysis of state interests
in a recognition dispute comes into even sharper focus.
I.  STATE INTERESTS IN RECOGNITION DISPUTES
A. Regulation of Intimate Conduct
The central governmental interest that state courts have discussed
in their analysis of interjurisdictional marriage disputes has been the
regulation of intimate sexual conduct.  In most jurisdictions, of
course, marriage has been the exclusive avenue for noncriminal sex-
ual activity for at least a portion of the state’s history.  In that broad
sense, marriage laws have long operated in tandem with prohibitions
on fornication or adultery to give an exclusive legitimacy to marital
sex.  More narrowly, when states have used their criminal laws to pro-
hibit particular types of couples from engaging in any form of sexual
intimacy within the jurisdiction, courts have frequently concluded that
they must interpret their laws on the recognition of out-of-state mar-
riages in harmony with that express public policy.  Both in disputes
where the court has granted some form of recognition to an out-of-
state marriage and in disputes where the court has refused to give
such a marriage any effect, the manner in which the request for rec-
ognition would implicate the regulation of sexual conduct within the
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jurisdiction has been the primary concern.  Where giving effect to a
nonconforming marriage would undermine a state’s restrictions on
sexual conduct, courts have usually concluded that they must deny
such requests.  Where giving effect to a marriage would not derogate
from any conduct restriction, courts have often found that the state
has no strong interest in denying recognition.
This relationship between out-of-state marriages and regulation of
sexual conduct has been given voice most directly in criminal prosecu-
tions.  When a couple marries in one jurisdiction, moves or returns to
another jurisdiction where an intimate relationship between the two is
forbidden, and then seeks to offer the marriage as a defense to a sub-
sequent criminal prosecution, the clash between the asserted marital
rights and the state’s conduct restrictions is starkly presented.  In most
such cases, states have refused to recognize the marriage as an af-
firmative defense to the prosecution because doing so would directly
undermine the prohibition on intimate conduct.
The decision of the Supreme Court of Tennessee in State v. Bell9 is
one of the more frequently cited criminal cases in this respect, per-
haps because it offers one of the more colorful statements of the im-
perative that marriage recognition doctrine must track the conduct
restrictions of the local jurisdiction.  Bell involved the criminal prose-
cution of the husband in an interracial marriage for violation of the
Tennessee fornication law.  The husband and his wife had been mar-
ried in Mississippi, which had no antimiscegenation statute at the
time, and had then come to Tennessee, where interracial relation-
ships were categorically prohibited.  The husband sought to interpose
the Mississippi marriage as a defense to the prosecution, invoking the
general rule that the law of the place of celebration should govern the
effect given to a marriage.10  The court refused, warning that accept-
ing that view in all cases would permit hordes of “unnatural” cou-
plings to invade the state:
Extending [sic] the rule to the width asked for by the defendant, and
we might have in Tennessee the father living with his daughter, the son
with the mother, the brother with the sister, in lawful wedlock, because
they had formed the relations in a State or country where they were not
prohibited.  The Turk or Mohammedan, with his numerous wives, may
establish his harem at the doors of the capitol, and we are without rem-
9
66 Tenn. 9 (1872).
10
Id. at 9-10.
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edy.  Yet none of these are more revolting, more to be avoided, or more
unnatural than the case before us.
11
As the Tennessee court explained some years later in expanding
upon its holding in Bell, the refusal to recognize an interracial mar-
riage as a defense to a criminal prosecution was necessary to give ef-
fect to “the very pronounced convictions of the people of this State
[in the criminal code] as to the demoralization and debauchery in-
volved in such alliances.”12  Courts have routinely offered such expla-
nations in refusing to recognize a marriage as a defense to a criminal
prosecution, both in miscegenation cases13 and in prosecutions involv-
ing bigamous or consanguineous marriages.14  The former require-
ment in many jurisdictions that the state prove actual cohabitation be-
fore a couple could be convicted for miscegenation similarly revealed
11
Id. at 11.
12
Pennegar v. State, 10 S.W. 305, 307 (Tenn. 1889) (exploring distinctions be-
tween State v. Bell and a prosecution involving a remarriage following adultery).
13
See, e.g., State v. Tutty, 41 F. 753, 761-62 (S.D. Ga. 1890) (denying effect to a
D.C. interracial marriage offered as a defense to criminal prosecution for interracial
fornication in Georgia); Kinney v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 858, 866 (1878)
(refusing to recognize an out-of-state marriage as a defense in an antimiscegenation
prosecution, because doing so would undermine laws of the jurisdiction that “pro-
hibit[ed] and punish[ed] such unnatural alliances with severe penalties”); see also Lov-
ing v. Commonwealth, 147 S.E.2d 78, 82 (Va. 1966) (holding that the state’s interest in
refusing to recognize an interracial marriage persisted even if the state could not
prosecute the couple directly for interracial sexual conduct), rev’d, Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
14
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Devine v. Rodgers, 109 F. 886, 888 (E.D. Pa. 1901)
(refusing to recognize a marriage between an uncle and his niece as a defense against
deportation because “a continuance of the relation . . . would at once expose the par-
ties to indictment in the criminal courts, and to punishment by fine and imprisonment
in the penitentiary”); People v. Ezeonu, 588 N.Y.S.2d 116, 118 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County
1992) (denying effect to a husband’s purported second marriage in Nigeria as a de-
fense to a statutory rape charge involving a thirteen-year-old girl in New York); State v.
Brown, 23 N.E. 747, 750 (Ohio 1890) (refusing to read an exception for validly mar-
ried couples into a statute criminalizing sex between an uncle and his niece because
the state is “not bound, upon principles of comity, to permit persons to violate our
criminal laws . . . because they have assumed, in another state or country where it was
lawful, the relation which led to the acts prohibited by our laws”); Pennegar, 10 S.W. at
308 (denying effect to a second marriage by a couple who married following the wife’s
divorce for adultery in a previous marriage, because “their return to this State and co-
habiting as man and wife” violated Tennessee’s “lewdness” statute and threatened
“public morals, peace, and [the] good order of society”); see also Commonwealth v.
Lane, 113 Mass. 458, 461-62 (1873) (preventing the prosecution of a Massachusetts
man who was divorced on grounds of adultery and then traveled to New Hampshire to
evade a local restriction and marry his former lover, because the relationship was not
absolutely prohibited under Massachusetts law); State v. Fenn, 47 Wash. 561, 565
(1907) (arriving at a similar conclusion for a Washington citizen who traveled to Brit-
ish Columbia to remarry shortly following a local divorce).
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the concern with regulation of intimate conduct that lay at the core of
these prosecutions.15  To be sure, there are exceptions to this rule—
cases in which courts have allowed criminal defendants to shield them-
selves from prosecution through the invocation of a nonconforming
marriage.16  But the paucity of such exceptions in the criminal context
proves the rule, and, even in such cases, the state’s interest in reinforc-
ing its local restrictions on intimate conduct has loomed large in the
conflicts analysis.17
Outside the context of criminal prosecution, in contrast, courts
have frequently given effect to marriages that would violate local re-
strictions on intimate conduct, provided that the purpose for which
the marriage is offered does not involve the introduction of that pro-
hibited conduct into the state.  The issue arises most frequently in
disputes over inheritance and probate, where one party makes claims
upon an estate that depend upon the validity of the decedent’s out-of-
state marriage.  Obviously enough, the court can give effect to a mar-
riage in administering an estate without licensing any prospective vio-
lations of the jurisdiction’s criminal code.  Many courts have ex-
plained that the state has no weighty interest in denying effect to an
out-of-state marriage in such a case, precisely because the invocation
of the marriage in probate does not interfere with local conduct re-
strictions.  In the absence of any argument about the regulation of in-
15
See Andrew Koppelman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Civil Unions:  A Hand-
book for Judges, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2143, 2151 n.36 (collecting cases illustrating this
phenomenon).
16 See, e.g., State v. Ross, 76 N.C. 242, 246-47 (1877) (recognizing an out-of-state
interracial marriage as a defense in a criminal prosecution for fornication and adul-
tery, despite the invalidity of the marriage in the local jurisdiction); see also State v.
Graves, 307 S.W.2d 545, 551 (Ark. 1957) (permitting the husband and parents of an
underage bride to invoke marriage as a defense to criminal prosecution for delin-
quency of a minor, despite deliberate evasion of Arkansas marriage laws).  But see State
v. Kennedy, 76 N.C. 251, 253 (1877) (refusing, in a companion case to Ross, to recog-
nize an out-of-state interracial marriage where the North Carolina couple clearly and
deliberately evaded local marriage restrictions).
17
See Ross, 76 N.C. at 246 (“However revolting to us and to all persons . . . [an in-
terracial] marriage may appear, such cannot be said to be the common sentiment of
the civilized and Christian world.”); id. at 247 (“The only evil which could be avoided
by [denying effect to the marriage] is that the people of this State might be spared the
bad example of an unnatural and immoral but lawful cohabitation.”); id. at 250
(Reade, J., dissenting) (“[I]ndividuals who have formed relations which are obnoxious
to our laws can find their comfort in staying away from us.”); see also Graves, 307 S.W.2d
at 554 (Smith, J., concurring) (“It was at first my inclination to . . . [say] that although
the validity of this marriage would be recognized in this state our policy against under-
age marriages should prevent the couple from living together until attaining the age at
which they might have been married in Arkansas . . . .”).
2222 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 153: 2215
timate conduct within the jurisdiction, these courts have often con-
cluded, the state has no good reason to frustrate the private reliance
interests of the parties or to depart from the general rule of comity
that calls for the recognition of marriages that were valid where per-
formed.18
The decision of the California Court of Appeals in In re Dalip Singh
Bir’s Estate makes the point succinctly.19  Dalip Singh Bir involved the
probate of the California holdings of a native of India who died intes-
tate in California, leaving two wives in India who both made claims
upon the estate as widows.  Both women had lawfully married the de-
cedent in India and had lived with him in the Punjab Province, but
the trial court in California refused to recognize the validity of the
more recently celebrated marriage in the probate proceeding, con-
cluding that local law only permitted the court to give effect to one of
18
As conflicts scholars must explain with increasing frequency, the decision by
one state to give effect to a marriage performed in another state is a matter of comity,
not constitutional or federal mandate.  The Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. CONST.
art. IV, § 1, and its federal implementing legislation, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000), impose a
mandatory duty of recognition upon judgments, but legislative enactments and li-
censes carry no such weight.  Compare Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233-34
(1998) (holding that full faith and credit recognizes no public policy exception for the
enforcement of judgments, which must be given effect when rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction), with Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981) (plu-
rality opinion) (finding that a court conducting a choice-of-law analysis may disregard
the law of another jurisdiction provided that local law has “significant contact or [a]
significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, with the parties and the oc-
currence or transaction”), and Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 227 (1945)
(recognizing the power of one state to give no effect to a divorce decree entered by
another state where the forum concludes that the parties were not domiciled in the
state issuing the decree at the time of its issuance).
Of course, a court must act consistently with the other demands of the U.S. Consti-
tution when it chooses whether to give effect to an out-of-state marriage.  Loving itself,
for example, was a recognition dispute involving a criminal prosecution in which Vir-
ginia refused to give effect to an interracial marriage performed in the District of Co-
lumbia.  The basis of the Supreme Court’s holding in that case was that Virginia had
chosen an illegitimate basis on which to deny recognition to that marriage (and on
which to prohibit the Lovings from marrying locally).  Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
11 (1967).  Professor Kramer has argued that the Full Faith and Credit Clause itself
imposes an obligation upon states to choose neutral criteria for determining when to
give effect to domestic laws, rather than making judgments based upon mere policy
preferences.  See Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitu-
tional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1967-68 (1997).  That view has not yet
gained wide acceptance.
19
188 P.2d 499 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1948).  Dalip Singh Bir is a regular sta-
ple of the conflicts casebook.  See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, HERMA HILL KAY & LARRY
KRAMER, CONFLICT OF LAWS:  CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS 37 (6th ed. 2001).
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the marriages.20  The appeals court reversed, concluding that there
was no good reason to deny effect to the marriage when doing so
would not interfere with any restrictions on the regulation of intimate
conduct within California:
The decision of the trial court was influenced by the rule of “public pol-
icy” [against polygamous marriages]; but that rule, it would seem, would
apply only if decedent had attempted to cohabit with his two wives in
California.  Where only the question of descent of property is involved,
“public policy” is not affected.21
20
Dalip Singh Bir, 188 P.2d at 499-500.
21
Id. at 502.  The Supreme Court of Louisiana appears to have reached a similar
conclusion in a miscegenation case, though it was less explicit in its reasoning.  In Suc-
cession of Caballero (Mrs. Conte) v. Executor, 24 La. Ann. 573 (1872), that court took cog-
nizance of a Spanish marriage between a “colored woman” and a white man for pur-
poses of probating the husband’s estate.  In holding that Louisiana law did not prevent
that result, despite its prohibition on interracial marriage, the court explained that
Louisiana law:
[C]ould not and did not aim to affect elsewhere the validity of a marriage like
that of the parents of the plaintiff.  It was strictly personal to parties living in
Louisiana, who had anywhere contracted the kind of marriage not permitted
by its policy, and did not, as in the plaintiff’s case, affect the children of such
parents legitimated in other countries and not incapacitated here on other
grounds.  The policy of this State had no broader extent, because there was
no reason why it should have.
Id. at 575.  Louisiana’s antimiscegenation statute was concerned only with the regula-
tion of the behavior of Louisiana domiciliaries within the state (being “strictly personal
to parties living in Louisiana”) and, foreshadowing Dalip Singh Bir, there was “no rea-
son” to apply the prohibition where that interest was not implicated.
The Supreme Court of Florida also permitted its courts to take cognizance of an
out-of-state interracial marriage where the couple “did [not] reside” within the state
subsequent to their marriage.  Whittington v. McCaskill, 65 Fla. 162, 164 (1913).  The
court issued that ruling despite statutes criminalizing interracial marriage and declar-
ing such relationships “utterly null and void.”  Id.
In 1990, the Court of Appeals of New Mexico issued a fascinating decision that
also embraces a similar mode of reasoning.  The case, Leszinske v. Poole, 798 P.2d 1049
(N.M. Ct. App. 1990), involved a custody dispute between a divorced couple over their
three children.  The mother had become intimately involved with her maternal uncle
following the divorce, a relationship (and marriage) that was illegal under New Mexico
law, and the father offered that relationship as a basis for denying her custody.  In re-
sponse, the trial court actually encouraged the mother to follow through on a plan to
evade the marriage laws of New Mexico by traveling to Costa Rica to marry the uncle
and then relocating to California, where the liberal recognition laws would treat the
marriage as valid.  The court permitted the mother to retain custody on the condition
that she and the uncle enter into such a valid (if evasive) marriage.  Id. at 1051.  In re-
viewing the propriety of that order, the Court of Appeals stressed that it did not need
to “decide whether New Mexico would recognize the marriage mother planned in all
circumstances and for all purposes” but rather needed only to “decide whether, for
purposes of awarding mother primary physical custody, the district court did not err in
taking the planned marriage into account.”  Id. at 1053.  Despite New Mexico laws
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The California court joined a host of others in reaching this con-
clusion.  In Mississippi, the supreme court held in 1948 that interra-
cial marriages should be given effect in probate proceedings, despite
that state’s antimiscegenation laws, because the “manifest and recog-
nized purpose of” those laws “was to prevent persons of Negro and
white blood from living together in this state” and, where there is no
request for in-state cohabitation, “to permit one of the parties to such
a marriage to inherit property . . . does no violence” to the policy.22  In
New York, in another widely discussed case, the Court of Appeals gave
effect to the Rhode Island marriage of a Jewish uncle and niece in
probate proceedings, although the marriage was prohibited in New
York, because it found nothing in the positive law of New York that
declared such out-of-state marriages so “void” as to require exclusion
of the relationships from the jurisdiction for all purposes.23  The Mary-
land Court of Appeals came to a similar conclusion when it con-
fronted another such Rhode Island marriage.24
As with the criminal prosecutions, there are some exceptional
probate cases that come out the other way.  But even most of the out-
lier cases maintain a consistent focus on the centrality of conduct
regulation in describing the state interests that drive the decision.  In
some instances where courts have refused to give any effect to an out-
of-state marriage in probate, even where doing so would not derogate
from local conduct restrictions in any direct way, the court has identi-
criminalizing sexual relations between an uncle and niece and declaring marriages be-
tween the two “absolutely void,” id., the court found that the public policy of the state
did not require reversal because “awarding mother primary physical custody . . . was in
the best interests of the children and mother and uncle intended to reside in Califor-
nia,” Id. at 1056.
22
Miller v. Lucks, 36 So. 2d 140, 142 (Miss. 1948).  In 1875, the Supreme Court of
California went so far as to give effect, for probate purposes, to the marriage of a mas-
ter and his slave celebrated in the territory of Utah before Emancipation, despite Cali-
fornia’s prohibition on interracial marriage.  Pearson v. Pearson, 51 Cal. 120, 124-25
(1875).  The court’s conclusion in that case that the marriage was valid, despite the
status of the woman as a slave (and hence unmarriageable) at the time of celebration,
carries forward the conclusion that jurists came to gradually in the nineteenth century
that slavery could be sustained, if at all, only through the continuing operation of posi-
tive law.  See Tobias Barrington Wolff, The Thirteenth Amendment and Slavery in the Global
Economy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 997-1005 (2002) (discussing positive-law treatment
of slavery in interjurisdictional disputes).
23
In re May’s Estate, 114 N.E.2d 4, 7 (N.Y. 1953).
24
Fensterwald v. Burk, 98 A. 358, 360 (Md. 1916).  Both courts concluded that
marriages between uncles and nieces, though in violation of local law and “voidable”
during the life of the parties, were not so contrary to public policy as to be “void” and,
by implication, necessarily excluded from the jurisdiction in their entirety.  Id. at 137-
39; In re May’s Estate, 114 N.E.2d at 6-7.
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fied the criminal prohibition on intimate conduct as the source of the
weighty policy statement that has required that result.25  In other cases,
the court has identified another extraneous consideration that mili-
tates against recognition on general conflicts principles despite the
absence of any threat to local restrictions on conduct, for example, a
deliberate attempt by in-state residents to evade the local marriage
laws.26
In states where the legislature has chosen not to criminalize the
intimate conduct of particular types of couples at all, though forbid-
ding the couple from marrying within the jurisdiction, some courts
have taken the absence of a conduct regulation to indicate that the
state has little or no interest in denying effect to a valid marriage from
another state.  The Supreme Court of Kansas issued a holding to that
effect in 1981, for example, in a probate case involving a marriage be-
tween first cousins.  “Although our statutes prohibit first cousin mar-
riages and impose criminal penalties where such marriages are con-
tracted in Kansas,” the court explained:
[W]e cannot find that a first cousin marriage validly contracted else-
where is odious to the public policy of this state.  The reason for the in-
clusion of first cousins in [the Kansas marriage prohibition] has become
less compelling in recent years as evidenced by the legislature’s omission
of sexual intercourse between first cousins in the definition of incest.
27
The Supreme Court of Ohio is the only court of which I am aware that
has expressly come to a different conclusion, and it did so by rejecting
one of its own precedents that had previously embraced the argu-
ment.28
25
See, e.g., Catalano v. Catalano, 170 A.2d 726, 728 (Conn. 1961) (refusing to give
effect to a marriage between an uncle and his niece in a probate action because such
incest carries a penalty of ten years imprisonment and “[t]his relatively high penalty
clearly reflects the strong public policy of this state”); Rhodes v. McAfee, 457 S.W.2d
522, 524 (Tenn. 1970) (refusing to give effect to the “incestuous” marriage of a stepfa-
ther and his stepdaughter in an action for dower, because “where the same facts which
statutorily prohibit the marriage are also made a penal violation, such is indicative of
the pronounced conviction of the people of this State regarding such marriages”).
26 See, e.g., In re Mortenson’s Estate, 316 P.2d 1106, 1106-08 (Ariz. 1957) (refusing
to give effect to an interracial marriage during probate where the Arizona spouses had
deliberately evaded a local prohibition); Eggers v. Olson, 231 P. 483, 483-86 (Okla.
1924) (same); Greenhow v. James’ Executor, 80 Va. 636, 638-41 (1885) (same); see also
Brinson v. Brinson, 96 So. 2d 653, 659-60 (La. 1957) (refusing to give effect to a
“bigamous” marriage that preceded the husband’s divorce from his first wife where the
spouses went to a neighboring state and contracted marriage “in bad faith,” presuma-
bly to evade the local prohibition on bigamy).
27
In re Estate of Loughmiller, 629 P.2d 156, 161 (Kan. 1981).
28
That court refused to give effect to an out-of-state marriage between an uncle
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In short, throughout these varied forms and configurations of in-
terjurisdictional marriage dispute, the reinforcement of a jurisdic-
tion’s laws prohibiting disfavored intimate conduct has been the
dominant pragmatic interest that courts have identified in applying
their own restrictive laws to out-of-state marriages that were valid
where performed.  “Dominant” does not mean “exclusive.”  As I will
discuss in the sections that follow, courts have recognized other inter-
ests that states may assert in denying effect to nonconforming mar-
riages.  But the desire to prohibit disfavored sexual conduct and to
exclude disfavored relationships from the jurisdiction has been the
primary pragmatic concern around which state marriage-recognition
doctrines have taken shape.  Thus, in a modern dispute concerning
the out-of-state marriage of a gay or lesbian couple, one of the first
questions that most state courts might be expected to ask is how a re-
quest for recognition implicates the state’s policies concerning the
regulation of sexual intimacy and cohabitation by same-sex couples.
The range of legitimate answers to that question has changed
dramatically in the wake of Lawrence v. Texas.  The Supreme Court in
Lawrence interpreted the substantive right to “liberty” in the Due Proc-
ess Clause to extend its protection to intimate sexual conduct between
two partners of the same sex, declaring unconstitutional all those laws
that had prohibited private “sodomy” (oral or anal sex) between con-
senting adults in a noncommercial setting.29  The Court situated this
holding within a larger discussion of the relationships of gay and les-
bian couples, using unprecedented language to insist upon the equal
dignity of those relationships under the Constitution and explaining
and a niece, despite the repeal by the Ohio legislature of the criminal prohibition on
sexual intercourse for such couples, writing:
One of the purposes of the new Criminal Code was to decriminalize certain
unlawful sexual behavior and leave the parties to whatever chastisement soci-
ety would impose without making them criminally liable.  It was supposedly an
enlightened approach to “social crimes.”  We do not believe that the General
Assembly intended to change the state’s public policy so as to favor fornica-
tion, adultery, rape of one spouse by the other, sodomy, fellatio, homosexual-
ity and some forms of incest.
In re Estate of Stiles, 391 N.E.2d 1026, 1027 (Ohio 1979) (citation omitted).  In an ear-
lier case, the same court had suggested that the absence of a criminal prohibition on
intimate conduct indicated that a disfavored marriage was not so “void” as to require
denial of recognition when the marriage was validly performed out of state.  See Mazzo-
lini v. Mazzolini, 155 N.E.2d 206, 208 (Ohio 1958) (“It will thus be seen that first-
cousin marriages in this state are not made void by explicit provision to that effect.
Moreover . . . sexual relations between cousins are not incestuous.”).  The Stiles Court
treated this precedent derisively and limited it to its facts.
29
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003).
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that the protection of sexual intimacy for gay couples forms part of a
larger protection of their ability to enter into and maintain lasting in-
timate relationships.30  Although the Lawrence case itself did not deal
with an attempt by the state to prevent a gay couple from cohabiting,
the liberty interest that the opinion extends to gay couples clearly in-
cludes the right to maintain a family home, a right that straight cou-
ples have enjoyed for some time.31  Following Lawrence, same-sex cou-
ples have a right to enjoy private intimacy and to share a household in
which they can hold themselves out to their community as participants
in a committed relationship.
Despite the dramatic change that it effectuates in the relationship
rights of gay men and lesbians, Lawrence does not, of its own force,
confer a right upon same-sex couples to marry.  The Court took care
to exclude the question of marriage from the ambit of its holding.32
In future disputes involving the constitutionality of laws prohibiting
gay couples from marrying, courts will have to determine whether
Lawrence’s holding on liberty rights, issued in the context of a criminal
prosecution, should be extended to the denial of civil benefits and ob-
ligations—a real but very different type of burden to impose upon a
relationship.33
30
For example, in describing the nature of the liberty interest that it was recogniz-
ing, the Court wrote:
It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon this re-
lationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still
retain their dignity as free persons.  When sexuality finds overt expression in
intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in
a personal bond that is more enduring.  The liberty protected by the Constitu-
tion allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice.
Id. at 567.
Professor Katherine Franke has raised questions about the Lawrence Court’s deci-
sion to couch this liberty interest in such “domesticated” terms.  By identifying the
worth of sexual behavior exclusively in terms of a “more enduring” relationship,
Franke argues, the Court has offered a somewhat constrained form of sexual freedom
and, as it happens, mischaracterized the facts of the Lawrence case itself, in which the
defendants were not involved in a committed relationship.  See Katherine M. Franke,
The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1407-08 (2004).
31
See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505-06 (1977) (recogniz-
ing the constitutional right of a family to maintain a home together and extending that
right beyond the nuclear family to include a grandmother and her grandsons); Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (identifying the protection of the “mari-
tal bedroom” from intrusion by a state as one rationale for invalidating a restriction on
the use of contraceptives by a straight married couple).
32
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“The present case . . . does not involve whether the
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons
seek to enter.”).
33
See id. at 575 (discussing the particular stigma of criminality that Texas law im-
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Nonetheless, the Lawrence opinion does have an immediate im-
pact upon the range of interests that a state may legitimately assert
when presented with a request to give effect to a valid marriage from
another jurisdiction.  Heretofore, the recognition doctrines in many
jurisdictions have taken shape around a policy of excluding disfavored
conduct from the borders of the forum state.  The primary interest
that states have asserted in such disputes, consistent with their laws
prohibiting sex and cohabitation, has been an interest in maintaining
a community in which certain forms of sexual and intimate relation-
ship are not present.  Following Lawrence, a state can no longer claim
any legitimate interest in excluding the relationships of gay and les-
bian couples from its borders.
B. Expressions of Moral Disapproval
The other principal state interest that courts have invoked in de-
nying effect to out-of-state marriages has been a jurisdiction’s desire to
express moral disapproval toward certain types of intimate relation-
ship.  This symbolic or expressive interest is frequently offered in tan-
dem with the state’s more pragmatic desire to exclude the relation-
ship from the jurisdiction altogether.  Since there has been no serious
disagreement over the state’s power to regulate the sexual conduct of
its inhabitants in most of the interjurisdictional marriage disputes on
record, courts have not precisely delineated the independent work
that each of these state interests has performed in justifying a refusal
to give effect to a disfavored marriage.34  Rather, the jurisdiction’s ex-
posed upon gay couples); id. at 581-82 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (same).
34
The most noteworthy exception here is the decision of the Virginia Supreme
Court in Loving v. Commonwealth, 147 S.E.2d 78 (Va. 1966), rev’d, Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967), issued two years after the Supreme Court of the United States had
proclaimed in McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964), that states could not single
out interracial fornication for particular criminal penalty.  In preserving Virginia’s ban
on marriage between interracial couples despite the state’s inability to prohibit their
sexual intimacy, the court reverted to a statement about morality, as given voice by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888):
“Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as having more to do with
the morals and civilization of a people than any other institution, has always been sub-
ject to the control of the legislature.”  It bears noting that this passage, often repro-
duced by courts when ruling that a couple does not have a constitutionally enforceable
right to marry, is almost always quoted out of context and given a false meaning, as was
the case in the Virginia Supreme Court’s opinion in Loving.  The Maynard case in-
volved a challenge to a declaration of divorce issued by the legislature of the Washing-
ton Territory, which the disappointed party claimed was beyond the power of the legis-
lature because a divorce decree is inherently judicial in nature.  The Supreme Court
rejected that argument and upheld the decree, and the quoted language appears in
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pression of moral disapproval has served as a symbolic counterpoint to
its use of the criminal code to exclude the relationship from the
state.35
Expressions of moral disapproval appear most frequently in dis-
cussions of incest and consanguinity.  Joel Prentiss Bishop, the nine-
teenth-century treatise author whom courts relied upon widely in early
marriage disputes, offered the following account of the general rule:
Should there be, as occasionally may happen, a country or State permit-
ting marriages which by the common voice of civilized nations are vi-
cious past toleration, such marriages, though solemnized under the pro-
tection of its laws, would not be within the protection of the law of
nations because lacking the general favor essential. . . . [Such a mar-
riage] must be contrary also to the common voice of Christendom.  The
familiar illustrations, perhaps the only ones of which a writer can speak
with absolute assurance, are polygamous marriages and those of exces-
sively near consanguinity.
36
In particular, when courts draw distinctions between marriages that
are “void,” “absolutely void,” or “void ab initio” and those that are
merely “prohibited”—as with consanguineous marriages within a pri-
mary blood line (siblings; parents and children) versus those in a sec-
ondary bloodline (first cousins; an uncle and a niece)—they fre-
quently rely upon arguments from morality to account for the state’s
interest in extirpating the “void” marriages from the state’s borders,
often invoking the language of natural law and the values of Christen-
dom.37  In a more modern formulation, the Supreme Court of Arkan-
the Court’s discussion of the legislature’s competence to act on the matter.  Maynard
had nothing to do with the power of courts to review the constitutionality of legislative
marriage policies, and the Court did not speak to the issue.
35
For one example among many, see the discussion of incestuous marriages in
Beggs v. State, 55 Ala. 108, 112 (1876):  “Incestuous marriages are prohibited—are void
ab initio . . . . Not only are they prohibited, but those entering into them incur severe
penalties . . . . The incestuous marriage contravenes the voice of nature, degrades the
family, offends decency and morals, and is absolutely interdicted.”  Beggs itself was
about a bigamous marriage, but the court’s statement on incestuous marriage has ex-
erted influence in subsequent Alabama cases.  See, e.g., Osoinach v. Watkins, 180 So.
577, 580 (Ala. 1938) (referring to Beggs as a warning to those who might, in the future,
be inclined to disregard the law or undertake to evade its prohibitions).
36
1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES ON MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND
SEPARATION §§ 857-58 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1891) (citation omitted).
37
For example, in Garcia v. Garcia, 127 N.W. 586, 589 (S.D. 1910), the court
stated:
Incestuous marriages as spoken of by Bishop and referred to by the authori-
ties as being an exception to the [lex locis] rule embrace only such marriages
as are incestuous according to the generally accepted opinion of Christen-
dom, which relates only to persons in direct line of consanguinity, and
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sas, quoting Leflar, has framed the inquiry in terms of the level of “so-
cial alarm” that a disfavored marriage would engender.38  Similar as-
sertions appear in miscegenation cases, though with considerably less
frequency,39 and also in the special class of bigamy cases that arose in
those states that prohibited a person who had been divorced by rea-
son of adultery from marrying his or her paramour during the life-
time of the jilted spouse.40
brother and sisters, and does not embrace cousins.
(citation omitted); see also In re May’s Estate, 114 N.E.2d 4, 7 (N.Y. 1953) (concluding
that a marriage between an uncle and his niece “was not in the direct ascending or de-
scending line of consanguinity” and so “was not offensive to the public sense of moral-
ity to a degree regarded generally with abhorrence and thus was not within the inhibi-
tions of natural law”); Campione v. Campione, 107 N.Y.S.2d 170, 171 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1951) (marriage between an uncle and his niece “is not universally con-
demned” and so recognition “is not precluded by reason of moral turpitude”).  Some
jurisdictions have refused to recognize even marriages within the secondary bloodline.
Those courts typically invoke the same language of outraged moral sensibilities to ex-
plain that result.  See, e.g., In re Estate of Stiles, 391 N.E.2d 1026, 1027 (Ohio 1979)
(marriage between an uncle and his niece is “shocking to good morals” and “unaltera-
bly opposed to a well defined public policy”) (citation omitted).
There appear to be very few reported cases involving marriages within the primary
bloodline, presumably because no U.S. jurisdiction has ever permitted such marriages.
The states have adopted divergent policies on marriage within a primary family line
not related by blood, as between a stepfather and daughter, and disapproving jurisdic-
tions have treated these unions as the equivalent of primary bloodline incest and thus
void.  See, e.g., Rhodes v. McAfee, 457 S.W.2d 522, 524 (Tenn. 1970) (emphasizing the
importance of preventing “discord and disharmony in the family” in refusing to give
effect to a stepfather/stepdaughter marriage during probate).
38
See Etheridge v. Shaddock, 706 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Ark. 1986) (quoting ROBERT
LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 221 (3d ed. 1977)).
39
The high court of Oklahoma provides one particularly forceful statement, bor-
rowed from a treatise, in a case involving an evasive interracial marriage and a dispute
over the title to property:
Statutes forbidding intermarriage by the white and black races were without
doubt dictated by wise statesmanship, and have a broad and solid foundation
in enlightened policy, sustained by sound reason and common sense.  The
amalgamation of the races is not only unnatural, but is always productive of
deplorable results.  The purity of the public morals, the moral and physical
development of both races, and the highest advancement of civilization, un-
der which the two races must work out and accomplish their destiny, all re-
quire that they should be kept distinctly separate, and that connections and al-
liances so unnatural should be prohibited by positive law and subject to no
evasion.
Eggers v. Olson, 231 P. 483, 484 (Okla. 1924) (citation omitted); see also State v. Bell,
66 Tenn. 9, 10-11 (1872) (describing a ban on interracial marriage as protective of
“good morals”).
40
In one such case, the Supreme Court of Tennessee wrote:
[The prohibition] is expressive of a decided State policy not to permit the
sensibilities of the innocent and injured husband or wife, who has been driven
by the adultery of his or her consort to the necessity of obtaining a divorce, to
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Similar discussions of morality have been ubiquitous in public de-
bates over homosexuality and marriage.  Given the prominent place
that expressions of moral disapproval have occupied in past interju-
risdictional marriage disputes, one can readily expect that states seek-
ing to justify a refusal to give effect to the valid marriage of a gay or
lesbian couple will take the position that such a refusal constitutes an
expression of the jurisdiction’s moral disapproval of gay people and
their relationships.  But the Supreme Court’s recent decisions con-
cerning the selective regulation of gay people have placed significant
limitations on the independent doctrinal work that such expressions
of moral disapproval can perform.
In the 1996 decision of Romer v. Evans, in its first affirmative
statement on the rights of gay men and lesbians, the Supreme Court
rejected the proposition that bare expressions of animus or disap-
proval toward homosexuality, without more, could serve as a legiti-
mate basis for subjecting gay people to selectively disfavored treat-
ment.41  The case involved a state constitutional amendment that had
prohibited gay, lesbian, or bisexual people from claiming unequal
treatment under any state law on the basis of their sexual identity.
The Court found that the desire to express moral disapproval for ho-
mosexuality by making gay people “unequal to everyone else” did not
constitute a “proper legislative end”42 that could support such a classi-
fication.  Seven years later, the Court extended that holding to the
state’s treatment of gay couples in Lawrence v. Texas, overruling its own
be wounded, nor the public decency to be affronted by being forced to wit-
ness the continued cohabitation of the adulterous pair, even under the guise
of a subsequent marriage, performed in another State for the purpose of
evading our statute, and believing that the moral sense of the community is
shocked and outraged by such an exhibition, we will not allow such parties to
shield themselves behind a general rule of the law of marriage, the wisdom
and perpetuity of which depends as much upon the judicious exceptions
thereto as upon the inherent right of the rule itself.
Pennegar v. State, 10 S.W. 305, 308 (Tenn. 1888); see also In re Estate of Stull, 183 Pa.
625, 630 (1898) (holding that a bigamous marriage following an unlawful divorce is
“contrary to good morals” and not entitled to recognition).  For a case coming out the
other way on the issue, see Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 N.Y. 18, 37 (1881), which held
that a prohibition on remarriage following adultery is a “personal disqualification[]
arising, not from the laws of nature, but from positive laws” and so does not prevent
recognition of marriage performed validly in another jurisdiction.
41 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (ruling that an expression of “animus” toward gay
people is not a legitimate basis for state regulation); id. at 634-35 (stating that a
“bare . . . desire to harm” or disadvantage gay people does not constitute a legitimate
state interest) (citation omitted).
42
Id. at 636.
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earlier conclusion in Bowers v. Hardwick43 that moral disapproval of
homosexuality could offer a sufficient basis for singling out gay cou-
ples for unfavorable legislation.44  Lawrence itself rested on the protec-
tion of liberty in the Due Process Clause.  In a separate concurrence,
however, Justice O’Connor gave the equal protection argument more
prominence, explicitly resting her vote for reversal upon the proposi-
tion that “moral disapproval, without any other asserted state interest,
is [not] a sufficient rationale under the Equal Protection Clause to
justify a law that discriminates among groups of persons”45—a proposi-
tion that the majority acknowledged as “tenable.”46
There is considerable debate among constitutional scholars over
the broader implications of Romer and Lawrence.  The decisions cer-
tainly do not prohibit legislators from enacting policies that are con-
sonant with broadly held moral judgments, any more than the Estab-
lishment Clause forbids a legislator from enacting a law, like a
prohibition on murder, merely because it is consonant with broadly
held religious beliefs.  Of necessity, the decisions do rest upon the
conclusion that there are well-formed and poorly formed propositions
in morality for purposes of constitutional analysis.  “People should not
inflict physical harm upon others” is clearly a well-formed proposition
in morality in this regard, while “women should not work outside the
home” clearly is not.  But neither opinion offers much general guid-
ance about how to make such judgments.  What Lawrence and Romer
do make clear, however, is that a state must offer a concrete or tangi-
ble reason for denying equal treatment to gay people and gay couples
in order to assert the “legitimate” state interest that is the minimum
threshold of the Equal Protection Clause.47  An expression of moral
43
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
44
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571.
45
Id. at 582 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
46
Id. at 574-75 (majority opinion) (invoking Romer and acknowledging applicabil-
ity of that decision to state regulation that selectively disfavors gay couples).
47
Justice O’Connor expands upon this requirement in her Lawrence concurrence:
Moral disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate governmental interest
under the Equal Protection Clause because legal classifications must not be
“drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law.”
Texas’ invocation of moral disapproval as a legitimate state interest proves
nothing more than Texas’ desire to criminalize homosexual sodomy.  But the
Equal Protection Clause prevents a State from creating “a classification of per-
sons undertaken for its own sake.”  And because Texas so rarely enforces its
sodomy law as applied to private, consensual acts, the law serves more as a
statement of dislike and disapproval against homosexuals than as a tool to
stop criminal behavior.  The Texas sodomy law “raise[s] the inevitable infer-
ence that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of
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disapproval, unsupported by any more substantial explanation of the
state’s interest, is no longer a proper basis for denying recognition to
the validly celebrated marriage of a gay couple.
Neither can religious objections to homosexuality serve as an in-
dependent basis for such a policy.  The Court has long since held that
the Establishment Clause requires the state to articulate a clear secular
purpose for the policies that it pursues.48  The point is an important
one to make explicit in the present context for several reasons.  Relig-
ious ideology often constitutes the unacknowledged agenda underly-
ing those objections to homosexuality that are framed in terms of mo-
rality—unacknowledged precisely because of the well-established
requirement that state policies be justified by secular purposes.  At the
same time, religious ideology is often not coextensive with the species
of “animus” that Romer and Lawrence discuss at length.  Particularly in
the case of Christian ideology, objections to homosexuality often carry
with them a message that adherents believe to be redemptive and
transformative.  Pursuing a loving gay relationship is sinful, under this
view, but sin is a ubiquitous human condition, and some religious ad-
herents believe that gay people should be met with an invitation to es-
chew their homosexuality and “sin no more,” rather than with a mes-
sage of pure condemnation or animus.  The ultimate effect is the
same—the rejection of gay people’s relationships and identities—but
the sentiment is different.
State courts will need to be attentive to these interlocking argu-
ments in marriage disputes, especially when the religious sentiment
underlying the rejection of a gay relationship is allowed to go un-
stated.  The Establishment Clause forbids the state to embrace a relig-
iously motivated policy of “redemption” as a basis for discriminating
against gay couples.  Romer and Lawrence forbid the state to repudiate
the equal capacity for dignity in gay relationships by dressing a similar
policy in lay clothing.49  The state’s justification for any denial of equal
treatment to gay couples must be both secular and concrete.
persons affected.”
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (citations omit-
ted).
48
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (stating that a “statute must
have a secular legislative purpose” to satisfy the Establishment Clause); Agostini v. Fel-
ton, 521 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1997) (reaffirming that “we continue to ask whether the
government acted with the purpose of advancing . . . religion” in analyzing laws under
the Clause).
49
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (holding that the state may not adopt policies that
deny the equal dignity of gay and lesbian relationships).
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C. Dissuading Couples from Migrating to the State
A third interest that courts have sometimes suggested as a reason
for denying effect to an out-of-state marriage has been a state’s desire
to dissuade couples in a disfavored relationship from moving to the
state in the first place.  Unlike the interests in conduct regulation and
moralistic expression, which account for a large proportion of the dis-
cussion offered by state courts in interjurisdictional marriage disputes,
the desire to dissuade couples from migrating to the state is often left
unstated and implicit.  This is not surprising, as the desire to dissuade
a couple from moving to the state is effectively subsumed within the
criminal conduct regulations that prevent them from living as a cou-
ple once they arrive.  Nonetheless, there are some notable exceptions.
In one early antimiscegenation case, for example, the Supreme Court
of Virginia made clear its view that the denial of any effect to an out-
of-state marriage could play a useful role in dissuading undesirable
couples from migrating to the state.  Affirming the criminal prosecu-
tion of the husband in an interracial couple who had been married in
Washington, D.C., the court heavy-handedly opined that, “[i]f the par-
ties desire to maintain the relations of man and wife, they must
change their domicile and go to some state or country where the laws
recognize the validity of such marriages.”50  And in State v. Ross, in
which the North Carolina Supreme Court recognized the valid mar-
riage of an interracial couple as a defense to a criminal prosecution
despite the existence of a local antimiscegenation policy, the dissent-
ing judge left no doubt about the function that he believed that local
law should serve in dissuading undesirable couples from coming to his
state:
[I]ndividuals who have formed relations which are obnoxious to our
laws can find their comfort in staying away from us.
. . . It is courteous for neighbors to visit and it is handsome to allow
the visitor family privileges and even to give him the favorite seat; but if
he bring his pet rattlesnake or his pet bear or spitz dog famous for hy-
50
Kinney v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 858, 870 (1878).  Kinney went on
to request federal habeas assistance after the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed his con-
viction.  The federal court refused to set him free.  In apparent response to the state
supreme court’s suggestion that it could use its antimiscegenation law to deter unde-
sirables from traveling to the state, however, the district court did explain that a man
domiciled elsewhere and joined in a bona fide marriage “would have a right of transit
with his wife through Virginia, and of temporary stoppage . . . because those are privi-
leges following a citizen of the United States.”  Ex parte Kinney, 14 F. Cas. 602, 606
(C.C.E.D. Va. 1879) (No. 7825).
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drophobia, he must leave them outside the door.  And if he bring small
pox the door may be shut against him.
51
Since it is now clear that states cannot prevent gay and lesbian
couples from forming households and sharing sexual intimacy, the
desire of some states to dissuade those couples from migrating may
emerge as an independent and significant justification for refusing to
give effect to a valid out-of-state marriage.  That desire certainly finds
expression in popular discussions of the marriage issue, where it is not
unusual to hear those who are hostile to marriage between gay cou-
ples arguing that, if states give effect to such marriages, gay couples
will be more likely to relocate or travel to the state and become a visi-
ble presence.  This desire to dissuade married gay couples from join-
ing the community echoes what William Eskridge has referred to as
“no promo homo” arguments, which are pervasive in cases involving
gay litigants.52  In a broad array of disputes, states sometimes structure
their laws and policies to forbid government institutions from promot-
ing or encouraging any sympathetic treatment of gay people or gay
issues, particularly in employment and educational settings.53  And it is
not uncommon for these antipromotion policies to turn the corner
and become policies of active discouragement, seeking to dissuade gay
people from participating openly in state institutions even when they
cannot be excluded outright.54  It is not hard to imagine that states will
offer somewhat sanitized variations on these arguments in interjuris-
dictional marriage disputes involving gay couples.  “We cannot forbid
these couples from moving to our state,” the argument might go, “but
51
State v. Ross, 76 N.C. 242, 250 (1877) (Reade, J., dissenting).  The Kinney and
Ross decisions were both issued by courts in the South at the end of Reconstruction, so
it is not hard to fathom why the vocabulary of excluding undesirables from the state’s
borders was present in the minds of some jurists.
52
See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo:  The Sedimentation of Antigay
Discourse and the Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327 (2000) (de-
tailing the evolution of antigay rhetoric and discourse toward the position that equal
treatment constitutes inappropriate “promotion” of homosexuality).
53
The State of Minnesota, for example, has enacted an unusually blunt provision
in this regard, adopting a “rule of construction” that provides:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to:
(1) mean the state of Minnesota condones homosexuality or bisexuality or
any equivalent lifestyle;
(2) authorize or permit the promotion of homosexuality or bisexuality in
education institutions or require the teaching in education institutions of
homosexuality or bisexuality as an acceptable lifestyle . . . .
MINN. STAT. § 363A.27 (2004).
54
See Eskridge, supra note 52, at 1356-62 (discussing government programs struc-
tured to exclude or disadvantage gay people).
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we certainly don’t have to make it easy for them.  We are entitled to
encourage these couples to move elsewhere by denying them benefits
that would otherwise serve as an inducement for them to migrate to
our communities.”
In a recent decision involving the award of benefits to low-income
families, the Supreme Court has found any such desire to dissuade
unwanted citizens from migrating to one’s state to be categorically il-
legitimate under the National Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.55  The Clause had been largely moribund since its early
internment in the Slaughter-House Cases.56  In Saenz v. Roe,57 however,
the Court invoked the principles of national citizenship in striking
down a California law regarding the award of aid to families with de-
pendent children.58  California had expressed concern that it might
become a “welfare magnet” for citizens from poor states who would be
attracted to the higher level of benefits that California offered.  To
avoid this result, the state structured its welfare regime so that newly
arrived residents would be subject to a one-year probationary period
during which they would only be entitled to the level of benefits that
they would have received in their previous state of residence.59  In
striking down this provision, the Court explained that the National
Citizenship Clause embodied a right on the part of citizens to relocate
freely within the United States without being subject to penalty or dis-
suasion.60  The Court acknowledged that states might sometimes have
a legitimate interest in treating migratory arrivals differently.  It pre-
served its earlier holdings in Sosna v. Iowa61 and Vlandis v. Kline,62 for
55
The Clause reads:  “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside.  No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §
1, cl. 1.
56
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
57
526 U.S. 489 (1999).
58
See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 1145.03 (West 1993) (limiting the benefits new
residents could receive under California’s Aid to Families with Dependent Children
program for the first year they lived in the state to the benefits they would have re-
ceived in the state of their prior residence).
59
Saenz, 526 U.S. at 492-96.
60
The Court had recognized a similar constitutional right to travel in past cases
but had not found a stable textual home for the doctrine.  See id. at 498-504 (discussing
doctrinal evolution of the constitutional right to travel).
61
419 U.S. 393 (1975).  In Sosna, the Court upheld an Iowa law imposing a resi-
dency duration requirement upon those wishing to obtain a local divorce.
62
412 U.S. 441 (1973).  Vlandis involved an unsuccessful challenge to the common
practice of state universities to charge in-state residents lower tuition rates than out-of-
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example, by emphasizing the right of states to prevent citizens from
entering the state only for the purpose of acquiring a “portable” bene-
fit that they could then take elsewhere.63  Such alternative rationales
would be necessary to justify durational residency requirements, the
Court explained, because a desire to deter undesirable citizens from
migrating to a state “would be unequivocally impermissible.”64
Following Saenz, a state may not structure its legal entitlements—
including its policies regarding out-of-state marriages—for the
purpose of deterring undesirable couples from migrating to its bor-
ders.  The right that Lawrence affords to gay couples to form a house-
hold and share private intimacy is accompanied by a right to move
freely around the country in choosing where to establish that house-
hold without being subject to dissuasion.  A state cannot assert any in-
terest to the contrary in an interjurisdictional marriage dispute.
D. Interests that States Might Assert in Denying Recognition
As I indicated at the outset of this Article, I do not intend to argue
that states can never have a legitimate interest in applying forum law,
rather than the law of the place of celebration, to the marriage of a
gay couple.  If one starts from the presumption that a state may forbid
gay couples from marrying in the first place—which I do, for purposes
of this Article—then there will sometimes be legitimate interests that a
state might invoke in refusing to give effect to a marriage performed
in another state.
Most importantly, states have a legitimate interest in preventing
their domiciliaries from entering into evasive out-of-state marriages
for the purpose of circumventing a prohibition contained in local law.
In earlier marriage disputes, many courts concluded that evasive mar-
riages directly undermine the laws of the domiciliary forum and en-
courage other states to show disrespect for forum policies, to the det-
riment of interstate relations.65  Not all states share this view.  In
staters.
63
Saenz, 526 U.S. at 504-05.
64
Id. at 506.  The Court also noted that state policies that merely have the effect of
deterring migration would only implicate the constitutional right to travel if a func-
tional analysis demonstrated that the extent of the incursion was great.  Id. at 504-05.
It was policies aimed expressly at deterring migration that the Court condemned in
categorical terms.
65 See Koppelman, supra note 15, at 2152-53 (discussing evasive marriages).  Com-
pare State v. Ross, 76 N.C. 242, 246-47 (1877) (recognizing a bona fide out-of-state in-
terracial marriage as a defense in a criminal prosecution for fornication and adultery,
despite a local antimiscegenation law), with State v. Kennedy, 76 N.C. 251, 252-53
2238 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 153: 2215
California, for example, the state supreme court found in 1936 that
the values of stability and comity called for the recognition of mar-
riages that were valid where celebrated even in cases of clear and de-
liberate evasion.66  But either treatment of evasive marriages falls
within the legitimate range of conflicts principles that a state might
choose to embrace.
A state might also be able to assert a generalized interest in uni-
form application of its laws to all domiciliaries—a desire, that is, not to
give effect to nonconforming marriages within the jurisdiction, even
when they are the result of bona fide relocations by couples validly
married in other states—for reasons of administrative convenience or
apprehension about public perceptions of fairness and legitimacy.
Since gay people form a significant presence within the civil commu-
nity—about three percent of the population by conservative esti-
mates67—the potential for a starkly apparent difference in treatment
between long-term domiciliaries and recent arrivals is very real.  When
coupled with the protection that the federal Defense of Marriage Act
appears to provide to states from being “required” to recognize the
marriages of gay couples,68 such interests might suffice to support the
actions of a court that is determined not to apply the law of the place
of celebration to the marriage under any circumstance.
It is my hope, however, that this Article will help to focus courts
on the outcome that a good-faith analysis ought to produce in a mar-
riage recognition dispute involving a gay couple, rather than merely
(1877) (refusing, in a companion case, to recognize an out-of-state interracial marriage
where the couple clearly and deliberately evaded local marriage restrictions).
66
See McDonald v. McDonald, 58 P.2d 163, 164 (Cal. 1936) (holding that, even
where parties acted “with the avowed purpose of evading our laws relating to mar
riages . . . . [i]n the absence of . . . a statute . . . expressly and clearly regulating mar-
riages abroad, the lex loci contractus governs as to the validity of the marriage”); see
also CAL. FAM. CODE § 308 (West 2004) (embracing a place-of-celebration rule for Cali-
fornia).  But see id. § 299.2 (creating a singular exception to this rule for the marriages
of gay and lesbian couples).
67
See William B. Rubenstein, Do Gay Rights Laws Matter?:  An Empirical Assessment,
75 S. CAL. L. REV. 65, 83-86 & nn.56-65 (2001) (collecting different studies estimating
the percentage of self-identified gay people in the general population).
68
The Act provides, in pertinent part:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be
required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any
other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between
persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such
other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such
relationship.
28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000).
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asking whether the application of forum law to a gay couple’s mar-
riage, for any and all purposes, can plausibly be justified.  The doc-
trines surrounding the treatment of out-of-state marriages have a long
history that has produced a well-developed body of case law in almost
every state.  Those doctrines can offer a refined account of the inter-
ests at stake in a marriage recognition dispute:  both the interests of
the state and those of individual litigants.  My purpose here is to aid
courts in exploring how those refined answers should apply to the
marriages of gay couples in light of the constraints that the Supreme
Court has imposed upon the permissible range of interests that a state
can legitimately assert in such a case.
In some states, for example, the rejection of nonconforming mar-
riages in past disputes may have rested entirely upon expressions of
moral disapproval and a desire to exclude the relationship from the
jurisdiction.  When confronted with a recognition dispute involving
the marriage of a gay couple, a court in such a state should acknowl-
edge that those earlier precedents do not offer much guidance for de-
termining what interests are legitimately at stake in the present dis-
pute.  In particular, a court should require a litigant in such a case to
identify with precision the “public policy” that it seeks to invoke in
urging that the court give no effect to a valid marriage, as the Califor-
nia Court of Appeals did in Dalip Singh Bir.69  Similarly, if it becomes
clear to a court that a state has restructured its laws concerning out-of-
state marriages for the purpose of dissuading gay couples from migrat-
ing to the state, that fact should cause the court to look with skepti-
cism upon any neutral-sounding reasons that the state might offer for
refusing to give effect to a couple’s marriage in a particular case.
Linda Silberman is correct when she observes that, if a state is de-
termined to deny any effect to the marriage of a gay couple, it could
likely circumvent such restrictions by limiting itself to a constitution-
ally acceptable repertoire of interests when it crafts its litigation posi-
tion (provided that the legislature’s statements of policy on the issue
would permit such readjustment).70  But the observation is less
pointed than Silberman believes.  There is real value in mandating a
process under which a litigant must offer a complete and precise ac-
69
See In re Dalip Singh Bir’s Estate, 188 P.2d 499, 502 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist.
1948) (finding that “public policy” was not offended when the purpose for which the
nonconforming marriage was offered did not offend any restriction on local California
behavior).
70
See Linda Silberman, Same-Sex Marriage:  Refining the Conflict of Laws Analysis, 153
U. PA. L. REV. 2195, 2211-12 (2005).
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count of its position and its reasoning, even if it is clear that the liti-
gant can ultimately prevail once it does so.  This is particularly the
case when the litigant is the state, for such a process forces the state to
take broader responsibility for the policies that it embraces.  Thus, a
state might be unwilling to adopt the position that all nonconforming
marriages of migratory couples (same-sex or otherwise) must be de-
nied any effect in order to avoid perceptions of unfairness in the dif-
ferent options available to long-term domiciliaries and recent arrivals,
if that is the only litigation position that will permit the state to
achieve its desired outcome.  Indeed, in those jurisdictions that al-
ready offer some measure of state support to gay couples through
domestic partnership or other arrangements, the state might be un-
able to sustain such an argument with any credibility.71
It is asking a lot to require courts to engage in such a careful and
detailed analysis of a state’s legitimate interests, especially in an area
that has such a demonstrated capacity to provoke strong emotions.
But I am optimistic that courts will rise to this challenge, for the struc-
tural preference for reflection and deliberation that is embedded in
the adjudicatory process has a capacity to bring out the better instincts
of judges.  The type of analysis that I suggest here offers a model for a
modest, case-by-case application of the Supreme Court’s recent consti-
tutional rulings.  Such an approach should be attractive to any state
court that wishes to give those constitutional rulings their due but is
wary of issuing an unsustainably broad and categorical holding on the
question of recognition.
II.  LEGISLATIVE PROHIBITIONS AND THE MINI DEFENSE
OF MARRIAGE ACTS
Since the Hawai’i Supreme Court’s decision in Baehr v. Lewin72
first drew national attention to the marriage rights of gay and lesbian
couples, an increasing number of states have enacted provisions de-
claring marriages between same-sex couples to be contrary to their
public policy and “void.”  The most recent election cycle saw twelve
such provisions enacted in the form of state constitutional amend-
ments, bringing the total count on statutory and constitutional provi-
71
See, e.g., Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 765 N.Y.S.2d 411, 422 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 2003) (permitting a partner joined in a Vermont civil union to sue as a
“spouse” under New York’s wrongful death statute in part because of New York City’s
extension of domestic partner benefits to gay couples).
72
852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
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sions to thirty-nine.73  State courts might be tempted to read these
“mini Defense of Marriage Acts” as requiring them to give no effect of
any kind to the out-of-state marriages of same-sex couples and to de-
clare them a nullity in all cases, rendering unnecessary any analysis of
choice of law, state interests, or individual hardship.  But the proper
treatment of these provisions is a much more complicated question.
State courts have had many occasions in the past to interpret statutory
provisions declaring interracial, consanguineous, and other disfavored
marriages to be “void,” “void ab initio,” or “absolutely void.”  Despite
the manifest hostility that such provisions have exhibited toward the
targeted relationships, a significant number of courts have adopted
mitigating constructions of them.  Specifically, these courts have
adopted clear-statement rules that have interpreted declarations of in-
validity or voidness to apply only to locally celebrated marriages unless
the legislature has made explicit its desire to extend those declara-
tions to valid marriages from other jurisdictions.
This clear-statement requirement finds its most forceful expres-
sion in cases that involve a request to nullify an existing marriage, as
in an annulment proceeding.74  This is unsurprising, since a rule
73
See Koppelman, supra note 15, app.
74
See, e.g., McDonald v. McDonald, 58 P.2d 163, 164 (Cal. 1936) (denying a re-
quest for annulment because, “[i]n the absence of . . . a statute . . . expressly and
clearly regulating marriages abroad, the lex loci contractus governs as to the validity of
the marriage”); Hilliard v. Hilliard, 209 N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (Sup. Ct. Greene County
1960) (denying a request for annulment and refusing to apply state law declaring un-
derage marriages to be “void” to an out-of-state marriage in the absence of clear legis-
lative intent); Campione v. Campione, 107 N.Y.S.2d 170, 171 (Sup. Ct. Queens County
1951) (same for an uncle/niece marriage); Garcia v. Garcia, 127 N.W. 586, 588-90
(S.D. 1910) (adopting a clear-statement requirement in denying the request for a uni-
lateral annulment of a first-cousin marriage).
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma adopted a similar rule in the case of an interra-
cial marriage that was validly celebrated within an Indian territory that later came un-
der the jurisdiction of an Oklahoma law declaring such marriages null and void.  The
court concluded that it should only apply the antimiscegenation law prospectively and
not interpret it to void prior marriages, despite the strong public policy of the state on
the issue, because of the hardship that would otherwise result:
The wisdom of [antimiscegenation] acts prohibiting future marriage between
such persons has also received the approbation of some of the most respect-
able courts of the land.  It is said that the amalgamation of the white and
black races is productive of deplorable results, but an act designed to wipe out
by the wholesale legal, existing marriages between members of the white and
black races would be almost profligate in its tendency, and productive of even
more deplorable results.  We would be unwilling to say that the Legislature in-
tended to destroy legal relations, such as that of marriage which had already
become fixed, in the absence of plain and unmistakable language to that ef-
fect in the act.
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authorizing a spouse to obtain a unilateral order of annulment could
permanently extinguish the legitimate expectations of the other
spouse whenever the couple, or perhaps even one spouse, traveled
through a hostile state.  As the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts said in Medway v. Needham, one of the most widely discussed of
the early marriage cases, “it would produce greater inconveniences
than those attempted to be guarded against, if a contract of this sol-
emn nature, valid in a neighboring state, could be dissolved at the will
of either of the parties, by stepping over the line of a state, which
might prohibit such marriages.”75  Even where the local feeling toward
a disfavored marriage is strident, courts have been unwilling to impose
such harsh results without unmistakable legislative direction.76  In-
deed, if a state with no significant contacts with an out-of-state mar-
riage sought to nullify the marriage on the basis of a transient exercise
of jurisdiction, and thereby to transform the personal and property
rights of the spouses according to its own forum law upon their return
to the marital domicile, that act would seem to violate the constitu-
tional limits on legislative jurisdiction set forth in Allstate v. Hague and
Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts.77  Courts thus have good reason to tread
cautiously in cases involving annulment.
A significant number of courts have also adopted clear-statement
rules in custody disputes and in probate proceedings and other suits
Scott v. Epperson, 284 P. 19, 21 (Okla. 1930).
75
16 Mass. (15 Tyng) 157, 159 (1819); see also, e.g., Garcia, 127 N.W. at 588-89 (dis-
cussing and adopting Medway’s clear-statement reasoning).
76
Naturally, there are exceptions.  In one prominent case, for example, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia affirmed an order nullifying an evasive interracial marriage
without any such clear legislative direction.  See Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va.
1955).  The bulk of the court’s reasoning in that case was devoted to rejecting a consti-
tutional challenge to the restrictive Virginia marriage law; it did not address the inter-
jurisdictional feature of the dispute at all.  See id. at 750-56.
While the Ohio Supreme Court did not address the issue in either case, the par-
ticular hardship associated with a unilateral annulment may account in part for the
different results that the court reached on the recognition of uncle/niece marriages in
Mazzolini v. Mazzolini, 155 N.E.2d 206 (Ohio 1958), in which it refused to annul an eva-
sive marriage entered into by an uncle and his niece, and its later repudiation of that
case in In re Estate of Stiles, 391 N.E.2d 1026, 1027 (Ohio 1979), in which it gave no ef-
fect to an uncle/niece marriage in an intestacy proceeding.
77
In Allstate, the Court found that the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit
Clauses together require that a state have a significant aggregation of contacts with a
transaction or dispute before applying its laws to that dispute.  Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981).  In Shutts, the Court found this requirement to be
violated in cases where the only contact between the forum and the dispute consisted
in the decision of the plaintiff to file suit in the forum.  Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 815-23 (1985).
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involving property rights, even though the prospective treatment of
the marriage itself has not been at stake.  Invoking the language of ex-
traterritoriality, these courts have insisted that the legislature make
clear its intent to interfere with rights and expectations created by the
law of another forum before it will apply its declaration of voidness to
a valid marriage performed abroad.  In a 1986 custody dispute, for ex-
ample, the Supreme Court of Arkansas interpreted a state statute that
declared first-cousin marriages “absolutely void” to apply only to mar-
riages performed locally, despite the unqualified language, because
the statute did not expressly provide that “marriages such as the one
involved here, celebrated in another state, are void in the State of Ar-
kansas.”78  Even though the marriage in question was deliberately eva-
sive—the father had attempted to marry his cousin in Arkansas, dis-
covered that the marriage was prohibited, and then “made a trip to
Texas for the sole purpose of remarrying there”79—the Arkansas court
insisted upon receiving express legislative direction before it would
extend its local prohibition to an out-of-state marriage.80
Among the thirty-nine states that have enacted explicit bans on
marriage between gay couples, there is considerable variation in the
clarity and scope of the legislative prohibition.  Many of these states
have expressly considered the possibility of valid out-of-state marriages
and have enacted unmistakable prohibitions against giving them any
local effect.81  But in twelve of the thirty-nine states—Hawai’i, Illinois,
78
Etheridge v. Shaddock, 706 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Ark. 1986) (citation omitted); see
also State v. Graves, 307 S.W.2d 545, 547-48 (Ark. 1957) (embracing the clear-statement
rule in a criminal prosecution arising from evasive underage marriage); In re Miller’s
Estate, 214 N.W. 428, 429 (Mich. 1927) (embracing a presumption in favor of recog-
nizing valid marriages unless the legislature has made clear that certain types of out-of-
state marriages should not be valid); In re May’s Estate, 114 N.E.2d 4, 7 (N.Y. 1953)
(invoking the rule where the statute declaring uncle/niece marriages “void” “does not
expressly . . . void a marriage . . . solemnized in a foreign State where such marriage is
valid, the statute’s scope should not be extended by judicial construction”); Van
Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 N.Y. 18, 32-34 (1881) (same).
79
Etheridge, 706 S.W.2d at 396.
80
The opinion does not explain the precise role that the out-of-state marriage
played in the custody dispute.  The mother identified the father’s remarriage in Texas
as a change of conditions sufficient to warrant a modification of the custody order.  See
id. at 395-96.  Her argument appears to have been that the father’s maintenance of a
marriage in Arkansas in violation of Arkansas law constituted a basis for questioning
his fitness as a parent and hence revisiting custody.  In giving effect to the Texas mar-
riage, the chancellor effectively held that a parent did nothing “wrong” for custody
purposes, when he engaged in evasive behavior in order to enter into a marriage that
local law would have prohibited.
81
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.212 (West Supp. 2005) (declaring that “mar-
riages between persons of the same sex entered into in any jurisdiction, whether within
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Iowa, Maryland, Montana, New Hampshire, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming—the legislature
has made no mention of extraterritoriality or the treatment of mar-
riages that have been validly celebrated in other jurisdictions.82  As in-
terjurisdictional marriage disputes involving gay couples begin to
arise, courts in those states will have to look carefully at the purposes
for which those couples request that their marriages be given effect,
particularly where a denial of their request would frustrate reasonable
expectations or produce significant hardship.  Since states may not
exclude gay relationships from their territory, may not attempt to dis-
suade those couples from migrating to the state, and may not subject
them to disfavored treatment solely on the basis of moral disap-
proval—such that the range of interests that a state can offer in apply-
ing forum law to a bona fide out-of-state marriage is significantly con-
strained—there is good reason to demand clarity from a legislature
before assuming that it intended to impose such harsh results.
or outside the State of Florida . . . are not recognized for any purpose in this state”);
MO. ANN. STAT. § 451.022(4) (West 2003) (“A marriage between persons of the same
sex will not be recognized for any purpose in this state even when valid where con-
tracted.”).
Some of these provisions are remarkably punitive.  In Arkansas, for example, the
legislature has provided:
Any marriage entered into by persons of the same sex, where a marriage li-
cense is issued by another state or by a foreign jurisdiction, shall be void in
Arkansas and any contractual or other rights granted by virtue of that license,
including its termination, shall be unenforceable in the Arkansas courts.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-208(c) (Michie 2002).  The last portion of the statute would
appear to require Arkansas courts to disregard judgments involving custody, support
and other aspects of a marital dissolution.  Alaska has a similar provision.  See ALASKA
STAT. § 25.05.013 (Michie 2004) (“A marriage entered into by persons of the same sex,
either under common law or under statute, that is recognized by another state or for-
eign jurisdiction is void in this state, and contractual rights granted by virtue of the
marriage, including its termination, are unenforceable in this state.”).
82
The provisions in these states restrict the civil institution of marriage to oppo-
site-sex couples, often rejecting as “void” any marriage performed between a same-sex
couple, but they make no mention of the treatment of marriages celebrated elsewhere.
See HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1 (Supp. 2003); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 5/212 &
5/213.1 (West 1999); IOWA CODE ANN. § 595.2 (West 2000); MD. CODE ANN., FAM.
LAW § 2-201 (1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-401 (2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
457:1-2 (Supp. 2004); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-1-10 & 15 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2004); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 25-1-1 (Michie 2004), TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.001 (Vernon 1998);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.010 (West Supp.
2005); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-101 (Michie 2003).
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III.  A BROADER CONTEXT FOR THE RECOGNITION QUESTION
There is another important reason to train our focus upon the
fact that, following Lawrence, Romer, and Saenz, states may not attempt
to exclude gay relationships from their territory when they structure
their domestic laws.  The observation speaks to a broader fact about
the manner in which discrimination against gay men and lesbians is
often accomplished—that is, the distinctive mode of subordination of-
ten embodied in laws that are hostile toward gay people.  Antigay
policies regularly proceed on the assumption that, if the state simply
refuses to acknowledge the existence of gay people and their relation-
ships, those people and their relationships will actually cease to be.
Because gay identity is not readily apparent, and because the mecha-
nism of the closet can operate with astonishing tenacity and power to
erase gay identity when it is not consistently and actively expressed,
those who wish to exclude gay people from civil society can often ac-
complish that task simply by behaving as though gay people and their
relationships did not exist.83  I have referred to this dynamic as the
denial of the homosexual possibility.84  The most conspicuous instance
of this mode of subordination in American law is the U.S. military’s
Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy, which explicitly requires gay soldiers to
maintain a state of complete social invisibility if they wish to serve, in
order to foster in straight soldiers the comforting illusion that the
military is a gay-free zone.  But Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell is remarkable
only for the overtness of the coerced invisibility that it employs, not
the fact of it.
This dynamic is very much in evidence in discussions about the re-
lationship rights of gay couples.  In both constitutional disputes and
policy debates over marriage or civil unions, those who are hostile to-
ward gay couples regularly frame their arguments around the implicit
assumption that gay couples can be removed from civil society alto-
gether.  The maneuver is clearly in evidence, for example, in discus-
sions about children.
83
Professor Kenji Yoshino’s discussion of this distinctive mode of subordination is
the most theoretically rich.  See generally Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769
(2002) (discussing a range of behaviors that gay people offer in response to pressure to
remain in the closet and the ways in which the law fosters or encourages those “cover-
ing” behaviors); Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection:  The Visibility Pre-
sumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 485 (1998) (arguing, con-
trary to received understanding of equal protection, that invisibility or ability to
assimilate can contribute to political powerlessness).
84
See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Political Representation and Accountability Under Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1633, 1635 (2004).
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Antigay arguments often make broad assertions about the superi-
ority of opposite-sex couples as parents and caregivers for children.
As it happens, these assertions are belied by all the responsible social
science data on the question, which consistently show that gay parents
are no more likely to have bad outcomes with their children than are
straight parents.85  More importantly, however, these assertions exhibit
a seeming illogic as a basis for arguing that gay couples should be
prohibited from marrying.  Gay parents exist in large numbers and
will continue to exist without regard to the access that gay couples en-
joy to the protections of civil marriage.86  Lesbians enjoy the same
fundamental right that every woman has to become pregnant and
raise children.  Gay men and lesbians continue to have children in
opposite-sex relationships before coming out of the closet.  And gay
people serve as adoptive or foster parents, in one form or another,
throughout the United States.  The question is not whether gay par-
ents exist, or whether they should exist—they do, and they will.  The
question is what policies the state should adopt in making protections
and support available to those parents.  Even if there were any truth to
the assertion that gay couples are less good on average at being par-
ents, denying them the support and protection associated with civil
marriage would not prevent them from being parents.  It would sim-
ply undermine further their ability to provide a stable and nurturing
home.  To offer a simple point of contrast:  it would be absurd to sug-
gest that poor couples should not be allowed to marry, merely because
their children are more likely to have bad outcomes as a result of their
poverty.  The rational response to the problems experienced by poor
families is to make more support available to them, not less.  How,
then, does it make sense to argue that it is in the best interest of chil-
dren to deny any support or recognition to the relationships of their
gay and lesbian parents?
The answer is that these arguments about children are logically
coherent only if one implicitly frames the debate as a referendum on
whether there should be gay parents at all.  If one starts from the pre-
sumption that gay parents can be made to go away through the expe-
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See generally Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation
of Parents Matter?, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 159 (2001) (conducting a comprehensive review of
sociological studies of gay and lesbian parents and concluding that those studies accu-
rately report no difference in adverse outcomes based upon sexual orientation).
86 See GARY J. GATES & JASON OST, THE GAY & LESBIAN ATLAS 44-47 (2004) (col-
lecting and analyzing data from the 2000 U.S. Census regarding children being raised
by same-sex partners).
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dient of passing laws, then a policy of refusing all forms of legal assis-
tance and recognition to gay parents might seem to be a logical posi-
tion for one who believes that gay people should not be parents.  Of
course, if confronted directly with a question about whether the pas-
sage of laws can actually make gay parents cease to exist, opponents of
gay couples will be unlikely to claim such magical powers for the law.
The point of the argument is not to describe an actual state of affairs
that might be brought about through legislation.  The point of the ar-
gument, rather, is to encourage people to think and act as if such leg-
islative transformation were possible.  That is what is meant by the
term “mode of subordination.”  It is a behaving-as-if—a way of think-
ing and acting that will keep a group in a disempowered position,
even when the factual predicates on which that way of thinking and
acting rests are demonstrably false.87  When opponents of gay couples
frame the debate over marriage as a discussion about the best interests
of children, they contribute to the erasure of gay couples and their
children as a distinct social presence.88  At the same time, they render
invisible the very real harms that the children of gay couples suffer
from the denial of equal support and assistance to their parents.89
There is a powerful potential for this same dynamic to intrude
upon every dispute over the effect that the marriage of a gay couple
87
I see strong parallels here with Janet Halley’s brilliant reading of acts and iden-
tity in Bowers v. Hardwick.  See Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy:  Act and Identity in
and After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721 (1993).  Halley identifies a “chiastic”
gesture that runs throughout the majority opinion in Bowers in which the Court moves
seemlessly between two arguments:  the assertion that gayness is defined by the com-
mission of a shameful act (sodomy) and the assertion that gayness constitutes a per-
sonal identity.  See id. at 1745-49.  In Halley’s reading, this “double bind” creates a con-
stantly shifting terrain in which opponents of gay litigants can always select the
argument (“gay” as act; “gay” as identity) that best enables them to defeat a claim of
right.  “The master of a double bind,” as Halley puts it, “always has somewhere to go.”
Id. at 1749.  In my reading of the arguments surrounding marriage, opponents of gay
couples add an ironic element to this chiasmus.  The submerged argument—the fan-
tasy that gay people can be made to disappear through the act of legislation—usually
remains unspoken, rather than being invoked explicitly, as with the act/identity bi-
nary.  Nonetheless, that argument remains fully perceptible to the key audience—
those who ardently desire to believe that gay people can in fact be legislated out of exis-
tence—and it operates to smooth over the cognitive dissonance that would otherwise
flow from the unreal and illogical foundations of the arguments upon which oppo-
nents of gay couples explicitly rely.
88
See Eskridge, supra note 52, at 1365-72 (explaining that the primary effect of
antigay public policy is to make it more difficult or dangerous for gay people to have a
visible social presence in the community).
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See id. at 1374-75 & nn.199-205 (detailing harms suffered by gay people and
their families as a result of compelled social invisibility).
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should be given across state lines.  In debating how to treat a gay cou-
ple that marries in one jurisdiction and relocates to another, oppo-
nents of recognition often implicitly frame their arguments as a ques-
tion about whether those couples ought to be present in the state at
all as a visible social presence.  If pressed, of course, most of these op-
ponents will acknowledge that gay people will continue to exist re-
gardless of how laws are structured.  They may even grudgingly admit
that states have no power to exclude out-of-state gay couples from mi-
grating to their territory.  But when these facts are allowed to go un-
stated, the opponents will revert to arguments that operate from the
premise that gay couples and gay parents will cease to exist within
their jurisdiction if the law excludes them from its ambit.  In doing so,
they also shield themselves from the knowledge of the hardship that
gay couples and their children will experience if the state refuses to
give effect to their relationship rights.  This behaving-as-if makes it
easier to maintain a hostile posture toward the recognition of a gay
couple’s marriage while still preserving a self-image of fairness and
reasonableness.
Indeed, in several important respects, the recognition question
for marriages between same-sex couples has an entirely different
character from every major dispute over marriage policy that has pre-
ceded it.  These differences have analytical implications that will re-
quire the careful attention of state court judges.
First, one of the basic purposes of a restriction on prohibited con-
duct is to channel the regulated population into more acceptable
forms of behavior.  In the case of restrictions on marriage, the prohi-
bition on disfavored relationships has always carried with it an implied
mandate that people seek their life partners from a population that
the state deems acceptable.  In past disputes over disfavored relation-
ships, that mandate has always left citizens with meaningful opportu-
nities to find a spouse and marry.  There has never been any serious
suggestion, for example, that significant numbers of people experi-
ence themselves as “interracially oriented” or “incestuously oriented.”
As painful and disruptive as it is for any person to be told that she
cannot marry a particular person with whom she has fallen in love, the
fact remains that even those marriage restrictions that we now deem
offensive, like the antimiscegenation laws, left people with a real abil-
ity to pursue other options and build a life together with a spouse.
The same is not true of prohibitions on marriage by gay couples.
Most people—gay and straight—do experience themselves as having
only one option when it comes to the gender of their partners.  That
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is why we specify an identity category of “sexual orientation.”  In the
past, analyses of the equities and hardships attending a marriage re-
striction have relied upon the assumption that the individuals in-
volved had other options available to them in selecting a spouse.  That
assumption is not an appropriate one in the present context.
Second, and relatedly, in disputes involving race, consanguinity,
age, and divorce following adultery, unlike in the present context, it
has always been clearly established at the time the dispute arose that
the jurisdiction in fact had the power to criminalize or exclude the
disputed relationship entirely from its borders.  Thus, there is already
an existing jurisprudential tendency in the doctrine to frame the rec-
ognition question as a debate about whether the relationship should
be permitted within the jurisdiction at all.  The particular mode of
subordination that gay people must contend with—their compelled
erasure or invisibility—threatens to offer powerful, synergistic rein-
forcement to this preexisting tendency in the doctrine of cross-border
marriage disputes.  A responsible court must recognize this fact and
avoid this analytical mistake.
The proper question in a recognition case is not:  should gay cou-
ples be allowed within the jurisdiction at all?  The proper question is:
given that gay couples from other states may relocate and move freely
within the jurisdiction, does it make sense to give no effect to their val-
idly celebrated marriages, with all the attendant disruption to prop-
erty interests, custodial arrangements, and long-term planning that
such a refusal will entail?  Or does it make more sense to give effect to
those relationships in ways that preserve reasonable expectations and
avoid hardship, even when doing so diverges from the choices that the
local jurisdiction has made about the options available to its own
domiciliaries?  When framed in these terms, the policy analysis sur-
rounding the recognition question looks very different.
CONCLUSION
When a court must rely upon broad and categorical constitutional
arguments in order to resolve a dispute, it is an indication that there
has been an institutional failure of sorts—a failure by the legislature to
conform its policies to the larger set of norms that constrain its
authority, or a failure of the court’s own process of incremental deci-
sion making to provide a workable solution for a new problem.  While
a court should not hesitate to enforce broad constitutional principles
in appropriate cases, neither should it assume that the Constitution
can only operate in sweeping gestures.  Past disputes over race, con-
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sanguinity, age, and other contested relationship categories have pro-
duced a set of common-law doctrines that equip courts to ask careful
questions about the proper treatment of nonconforming marriages in
interjurisdictional disputes.  The Supreme Court’s constitutional rul-
ings in Lawrence, Romer, and Saenz can fit comfortably within those
doctrines, pruning and trimming the range of interests that a state
may legitimately assert in a cross-border marriage case without uproot-
ing the established forms altogether.  Until the nation achieves a
broader constitutional consensus on the marriage rights of gay and
lesbian couples, courts will have to exhibit care and diligence in per-
forming this important task.
